In fact, governments probably should only EVER deploy executables they have built themselves, using their own compilers (see the classic computer science paper Reflections on Trusting Trust).
You’d also need chip #microcode auditing and verification for security-critical systems. And some level of chip assurance. And 
Cell-like audits… Details to be determined 
I was talking to a colleague last week about what REAL #StrategicAutonomy would mean.
For software in critical infrastructure, I think it would include military hardware-like contractual provisions, requiring eg the full #audit and #escrow of all source code, including for updates… and the right at any time for governments facing supply/continued operation threats to use that escrowed code to recreate their own versions of the software, and use them until the supply threats are removed.
@bhawthorne @mhoye well, you don't have to trust anyone.
You could host yourself a "full node" for #Monero 
and choose where to spend or exchange it.
And #TxProof allows independent verification that a transaction happened, so even in a dispute case before some #Escrow you'd have clear-cut evidence that a transaction happened.
